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1. The opening passage of Aristotle’s Physics (184 a 10–16)
1. 1. The reconstruction of the syllogism
Aristotle begins the first book of his Physics with a chapter on method. In this chapter, 
Aristotle raises the question about the proper method of reaching the first principles of 
natural things. The proper method of reaching the first principles of natural things is 
evidently the proper method of natural science.
In his commentary, on the first book of Aristotle’s Physics, Philoponus1 remarks that 
it is Aristotle’s custom to begin his works from certain common assumptions (ἀξιώματα). 
1  All references to Philoponus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I.1 are to the page and line of the Berlin 
Academy Edition (CAG XVI) and follow the translation of Osborne 2006. See Philoponus in Phys. 3.14–25. 
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Ηere too, in the opening chapter of the Physics, it is from a common assumption that Aris-
totle makes his beginning: “since knowledge (εἰδέναι) and understanding (ἐπίστασθαι) 
or knowledge (εἰδέναι) and scientific knowledge (ἐπίστασθαι) come about in all the disci-
plines that have principles or causes or elements from knowing these principles or causes 
or elements, for it is then that we think that we know each thing, when we have identified 
the primary causes and the first principles and as far as the elements, it is clear that also 
for natural science we should try to define firstly the matters concerning the principles”.
The reasoning, as it is reconstructed from Philoponus,2 is the following: in natural 
science, there are principles and causes and elements. Every science in which there are 
principles and causes and elements becomes known when the principles and causes and 
elements have become known. Therefore, natural science also will become known when 
the principles and causes and elements have become known. Philoponus3 suggests that 
Aristotle for the sake of brevity sets down only the major premiss, the one that says that 
every discipline that has principles or causes or elements becomes known when the prin-
ciples and causes and elements have become known, and omits the minor premiss that 
natural theory has principles and causes and elements. According to Philoponus, Aris-
totle also omits the conclusion, which would be “therefore natural theory also becomes 
known when its principles are known”; he gives the consequence of this, namely that 
since natural theory or natural science becomes known when its principles are known 
(which was the conclusion of the syllogism), we should try to define the principles of 
natural theory or natural science.
Simplicius4 also reconstructs the syllogism which is implicit in the introduc-
tion (προοίμιον) to the first chapter of Aristotle’s Physics. This syllogism according to 
Simplicius is the following: natural things have principles. Knowledge of the things that 
have principles comes about from knowing their principles. Therefore, knowledge of 
the natural things comes about from knowing their principles. Therefore, knowledge 
of the principles of natural things is necessary to anyone who wants to possess the natu-
ral science. Simplicius5 remarks that Aristotle omits the minor premiss of this syllogism 
and he stresses that this is a premiss which does not need to be proved, because it will 
be obvious from the whole theory that will be presented henceforward. According to 
Simplicius, this is the reason why Aristotle omitted this premiss. Regarding this syllogism, 
both Simplicius and Philoponus agree that Aristotle omits the minor premiss as well as 
the conclusion of the syllogism which is implicit in this introductory passage of chapter 
one of the first book of the Physics. It is worth noticing that in the conclusion of the syllo-
gism the required object of knowledge for Aristotle is the principles of natural things, 
2  Philoponus in Phys. 3. 25–30.
3  Philoponus in Phys. 3.30–4.8
4  All references to Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I.1 are to the page and line of the Berlin 
Academy Edition (CAG IX). The translation is mine. Simplicius in Phys. 9.1–5.
5  Simplicius in Phys. 9.5–6. 
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whereas the object of knowledge for Simplicius is the natural things and for Philoponus 
the natural science.
According to the testimony of Simplicius and Philoponus, Theophrastus set out the 
whole syllogism at the beginning of his own treatise On Nature, thinking that an explana-
tion or a demonstration was also required for the minor premiss of this syllogism, the one 
that says that natural things have principles.6 Theophrastus supports this premiss in the 
following way: “if natural things are either bodies or have their existence in a body, and 
these things are composite, then natural things are composite. But all composite things 
have elements and causes and principles; for simple things are the elements of composite 
things. Hence natural things have principles and causes and elements”.7
Simplicius8 bears testimony to the view of Porphyry who believed that it is not the 
task of the natural scientist or the natural philosopher to search out if there are principles 
of natural things because the natural scientist or the natural philosopher always considers 
and treats these principles as given. Porphyry thinks that it is the first philosopher’s task 
to search out if there are principles of natural things. Furthermore, Simplicius9 thinks 
that Porphyry should rather say that it is the first philosopher’s task to search out which 
are the principles of natural things or he should rather say that it is the natural philoso-
pher’s task to explain or to demonstrate that natural things are composite and that they 
have principles and which are their principles. However, as it refers to the first principles 
considered as elements, Simplicius thinks it is the first philosopher’s task to identify the 
capacity of each element of natural things, i.e. the capacity of matter and form, since 
these are the elements of which every natural thing is composed.
According to J. Fritsche,10 Simplicius’ view is that the only task of natural science is 
to show or to prove that natural things are composed of matter and form, because in that 
way natural science identifies their principles, on condition that the First Philosophy or 
Metaphysics has already proved that the components of what is composed of matter and 
form are also its principles. In my opinion, J. Fritsche11 is right when he points out that 
Simplicius’ view represents a synthesis of the views of Theophrastus and Porphyry, since 
it combines the diverse tasks and aims of the natural science which have been reported 
by Theophrastus and Porphyry. Simplicius’ synthetic point of view is that when Aristotle 
in his Physics explains which and how many principles of natural things there are in that 
way and at the same time, he also explains that there are principles of natural things.12
6  Simplicius in Phys.9.7–10. Philoponus in Phys.4.8–15. 
7  Philoponus in Phys. 4.34–5.3.
8  Simplicius in Phys.9.11–12.
9  Simplicius in Phys.9.12–22.
10  Fritsche 1986: 171–172.
11  Fritsche 1986: 24–27.
12  Simplicius in Phys. 21.21–22 and 190.25–29.
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1.2. The terminology
The terminology which Aristotle uses in the opening passage of the Physics (184 a 10–16) 
is applied very carefully in order to show that each term represents a different way of 
coming to know the principles, although these ways are complementary to one another 
and not incompatible. Simplicius13 points out that εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι, i.e. knowledge 
and understanding (transl. C. Osborne)14 or knowledge and scientific knowledge (transl. 
R. Bolton)15 cannot be used in a parallel way to mean the same thing, because εἰδέναι has 
a wider meaning than ἐπίστασθαι, since we also use εἰδέναι with reference to what we 
grasp in perception and what we acquire by belief (δόξα) and with reference to the imme-
diate and indemonstrable premisses which are the first principles of demonstration. Gener-
ally we use εἰδέναι with reference to what is not subject to demonstration, while normally 
we use ἐπίστασθαι with reference to scientific knowledge. According to Simplicius16 the 
relation between εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι is analogous to the relation between genus and 
species. The fact that Aristotle uses εἰδέναι as prior to ἐπίστασθαι in this passage prepares 
the ground for the prominent role of perception in the empirical method of inquiry into 
the principles of natural things which will be presented shortly after.
Furthermore in the same passage Aristotle uses the verb γιγνώσκειν (184 a 12) to 
denote the procedure we follow in order to reach knowledge of natural things, whereas 
he uses the verb γνωρίζειν (184 a 12; γνωρίσωμεν 184 a 13) to denote the procedure we 
follow in order to reach knowledge of the principles of natural things. If natural things 
come to be known from their principles but knowledge of the principles of natural things 
ought to be gained from some previous knowledge, this would mean firstly that knowl-
edge of the principles comes from knowledge of other principles and so on; and secondly 
that principles are not real principles, since they themselves have principles. In this case, 
a danger of a regressus ad infinitum would emerge. According to T.M. Horstschäfer,17 
by using this slight terminological difference, which reflects a subsequent difference on 
a semantic level, Aristotle tries to avert the danger of a regressus ad infinitum.
We may also remark that in the opening passage of the Physics there are three differ-
ent terms, “principles or causes or elements” (184 a 16), and there is a need for us to clear 
whether these three terms are used as synonyms or whether they have different meanings. 
Philoponus18 suggests that Aristotle is either using “principles” and “causes” in parallel 
to mean the same thing, so that he is saying that both the efficient and the final are prin-
ciples and causes, but he calls the other two (the material and the formal) “elements”, or, 
alternatively, a) he predicates the first term, “principle”, of all in them in common, since 
13  Simplicius in Phys.12.14–20.
14  See Osborne 2006: 25, 28.
15  Bolton 1991: 2.
16  Simplicius in Phys.12. 21–25.
17  See Horstschäfer 1998: 15.
18  Philoponus in Phys. 6.9–17.
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he clearly calls each of them “principle” all over the place, and b) he predicates the second 
term, “ causes”, of the efficient and the final, and “elements” of the other two, matter and 
form. In my opinion, even if Aristotle in this passage refers to all the causes calling them 
“principles”,19 he is trying to display the principles of natural things as elements of them, 
i.e. he intends to show those principles of natural things which inhere in them as elements 
of them. This is what we can infer from the method of inquiry that Aristotle proposes to 
us in the next passage. By the term “ elements”, I mean matter and form, but by the term 
“principles”, I understand not only matter and form but also privation, which is also an 
adjunct accompanying one of the two elements of all natural things: matter. Privation is 
a principle of coming to be and passing away or a principle of change.
2. Two ways of acquiring scientific knowledge
Simplicius20 refers to the doctrine that Aristotle expresses in the first sentence of the 
Posterior Analytics, in order to show that coming to know principles of natural things 
involves also a kind of pre-existent knowledge: “All teaching and all learning of an intel-
lectual kind proceed from pre-existent knowledge”(An. Post.A 1, 71 a 1–2).21 Furthermore, 
Simplicius22 makes a distinction between what is self-evident and/or a principle of knowl-
edge by general consent and what comes to be known from pre-existing or previous 
knowledge. What becomes known through syllogism and demonstration always comes 
to be known from pre-existing knowledge. As G. Bayer puts it “principles of science 
constitute the pre-existing knowledge that is needed to ground the intelligibility of what 
one learns or teaches in a science”.23 As regards principles of natural things, knowledge 
of principles of natural things constitutes the necessary pre-existing knowledge or the 
prerequisite for knowledge of natural things. This pre-existing knowledge ensures for 
natural things their knowability and intelligibility. 
But what is the pre-existent knowledge when it is the principles themselves that one is 
coming to know? Simplicius asserts that since the question about the principles of natural 
things has been answered in many different ways by natural philosophers, it is obvious 
that the principles of natural things are not self-evident.24 
Both Simplicius and Philoponus recognize that there are two ways of acquiring scien-
tific knowledge. According to Philoponus,25 these two ways are: a) the demonstrative 
19  All causes are principles but not vice-versa; see Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV,1013 a 16–17. Privation is 
a principle of natural things in the sense that it is a principle of change, but is not reckoned among the causes.
20  Simplicius in Phys.15.1–4
21  Translation Barnes 1994.
22  Simplicius in Phys.15.4–8.
23  See Bayer 1997:112.
24  Simplicius in Phys.15.9–11.
25  Philoponus in Phys. 9.11–14.
36 Melina G. Mouzala / Patras /
method and b) the didactic method. These two methods are in opposition to each other. 
As Philoponus explains, this opposition is due to the fact that the demonstrative method 
demonstrates secondary things from things that are first and more fundamental in nature, 
while the didactic method, although it is also a kind of demonstrative approach, demon-
strates things that are prior from things that are posterior in nature, using inferior criteria 
or means of demonstration, or using a second rate type of demonstration.26 Philoponus 
adds that the second way is also called “evidential” (τεκμηριώδης). 
Simplicius27 recognizes two types of the more knowable or more intelligible and 
correspondingly two types of apodeictic knowledge: the first is the demonstrative way 
of syllogism, which is properly speaking a demonstration and is based on the principles 
of demonstration or the principles of demonstrandum, and the second is the evidential 
(τεκμηριώδης) way of syllogism, which is not demonstrative, and which is based on the 
necessary consequences and results of the demonstrandum. Simplicius28 points out that 
in this case although the consequences or the results of the demonstrandum are not prin-
ciples of the demonstrandum they are principles of this sort of proof, since they are more 
knowable or intelligible than the demonstrandum itself. Philoponus29 explains that we 
use this didactic or evidential method for certain things because we are unable to use the 
prior or demonstrative method, due to the fact that the nature of things is frequently in 
this condition, either through not possessing the more fundamental principles, or due to 
the fact that, though they do possess them, those principles are less clear and less know-
able to us.
3. The dual meaning of katholou
3.1. The Physics I.1 and the Posterior Analytics I.2
In chapter one of the first book of his Physics, Aristotle says that since our present task 
is to get to know the principles of natural things it is necessarily by the second of these 
methods that we must get to know them. So, according to passage 184 a 16–26, “the natu-
ral course is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more 
knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the same. Hence, we must start with 
things which are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, and move on to things which are 
by nature clearer and more knowable. The things which are in the first instance clear and 
plain to us are rather those which are compounded [= συγκεχυμένα transl. W. Charl-
ton] or indiscriminate [transl. C. Osborne] or confused [transl. L. Angioni] or jumbled 
26  Philoponus in Phys.9.14–17.
27  Simplicius in Phys.15.15–25.
28  Simplicius in Phys.15.25–29.
29  Philoponus in Phys.9.19–22.
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up [transl. R. Bolton] or mixed together [transl. R. Waterfield]. It is only later through 
an analysis of these that we come to know the elements and principles. That is why we 
should proceed from the universal to the particular. It is the whole which is more knowa-
ble by perception, and the universal is a sort of whole: it embraces many things as parts”.30 
The main problem that emerges from this passage is that this use of the terms “more 
knowable and clear to us”, i.e., καθόλου (universal), and “more knowable and clear by 
nature”, i.e., καθ’ ἕκαστον (particular), contrasts with another passage, where the sense 
attributed to them is diametrically opposite; the other passage is Posterior Analytics I.2, 
71 b 32–72 a 5: “Things are prior and more knowable in two ways; for it is not the same to 
be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more knowable and more know-
able to us. I call prior and more knowable in relation to us items which are nearer to 
perception, prior and more knowable simpliciter items which are further away. What is 
most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest”.31
It is worth considering if what is said here, in the first book of the Physics, is in conflict 
with what is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. The prima facie inconsistency 
between the Posterior Analytics I. 2 and the Physics I. 1 is a first impression which upon 
careful examination cannot be verified. Most scholars believe that there is no incom-
patibility between these two different kinds of explanation, but a slight terminological 
discrepancy between the two texts.32 R. Bolton33 admits that there is a contradiction 
“unless, as most commentators reasonably conclude, the use of the term καθόλου in the 
Physics I. 1 is peculiar and not the typical use displayed, for instance, in the passage at the 
beginning of the Analytics”.
Philoponus clarifies the use of the terms καθ’ ἕκαστον and καθόλου in the passage 
of the Physics and points out that the two passages are in agreement and not conflicting 
because the apparent contradiction is due to the dual meaning of καθόλου. According 
to Philoponus,34 by “universal” (καθόλου) Aristotle means here the particular (μερικόν), 
which is differentiated from the individual (καθ’ ἕκαστα) by virtue of the fact that the 
individual is definite, whereas the particular is indeterminate. So, the particular is noth-
ing but an indeterminate individual capable of being applied to many things. Philoponus 
thinks that this very property of being indeterminate is the reason why Aristotle calls 
the particular also “indiscriminate” and “universal”; “universal” because of its capac-
ity to apply to many things, while the individual applies to only one, and “indiscrimi-
nate” [συγκεχυμένον] because it applies in an indeterminate and inarticulate manner to 
the things it does apply to. Therefore, the “universal” here in the Physics means not the 
30  Mostly, I follow W. Charlton’s (1992) translation.
31  Τranslation Barnes 1994.
32  See Angioni 2001: 308.
33  See Bolton 1991: 4.
34  Philoponus in Phys.10.28–11.3.
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universal proper [κυρίως καθόλου], but what is particular and indiscriminate because it 
applies to many things.35 
On the contrary, in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle refers to the universal proper. But 
since in the Physics “universal” means the particular, Aristotle does not invalidate the 
main thesis of the Posterior Analytics, for it is true that the individual is more knowable to 
perception. The difference is that in the Posterior Analytics the universal proper is related 
to the particular (proper) only just as the prior by nature and more knowable simpliciter 
is related to the prior to us and more knowable to us, while in the Physics in addition the 
universal is related to the particular as the whole is related to its parts.
So, what Aristotle says in this first chapter of the first book of the Physics, the chapter 
on method, is that perception initially grasps the individual as an indiscriminate and 
inarticulate whole, i.e. as an indeterminate particular which can apply to many things. 
Philoponus explains that “…since all nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection, 
for this reason it is in an indiscriminate and inarticulate manner that perception first hits 
upon the individual, given that it is not immediately capable of distinguishing the charac-
teristic features of the individual from the rest. Hence, it was for this reason that Aristotle 
called such perceptual knowledge knowledge of the universal…”.36
Both Simplicius and Philoponus explain this kind of perceptual knowledge with the 
same example. Simplicius says, “when something is coming toward us from a distance, 
we can more easily perceive that it is an animal rather than a man, and that it is a man 
rather than it is Socrates”.37 Philoponus says, “when we see someone coming, we identify 
him first in accordance with the indiscriminate universals; For the first thing we think is 
simply that it is a body, then that it is an animal, then that it is a human, but not yet what 
sort of body or what sort of animal or what sort of human being”.38
3.2. The Physics I.1 and the Posterior Analytics II.19
I believe that there is a strong connection between the method described in the first 
passage of the Physics and the passage of the Posterior Analytics II. 19, 100 a 15–b 5, as do 
other scholars. According to R. Bolton, “Aristotle uses the same unusual language in the 
two passages to say the same thing”39. But R. Bolton,40 speaking of a close correspond-
ence between the two passages, mentions also the passage of the Posterior Analytics II. 19, 
100 a 7–8, where Aristotle refers to “the one apart from the many, what is one and the 
same in all those things”, i.e., to the universal proper [κυρίως καθόλου] or the standard 
35  Cf. Philoponus in Phys.17.25–26.
36  Philoponus in Phys.17.28–18.3.
37  Simplicius in Phys.16.18–20.
38  Philoponus in Phys.11.33–12.2.
39  See Bolton 1991: 9.
40  See Bolton 1991: 6.
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universal or the strict universal. R. Bolton41 supports a unified interpretation of καθόλου 
in the Posterior Analytics II. 19, claiming that katholou here has a meaning that is closer 
to the concrete whole or “composite” notion. He also believes that in both chapters, the 
Physics I.1 and the Posterior Analytics II. 19, katholou has a single meaning. Although 
I believe that when in the Posterior Analytics II. 19 the universal or katholou is referred to 
as an object of perception it has the same meaning of the “whole” or of the “composite” 
as in the Physics I.1, I am inclined to recognize that in the Posterior Analytics II. 19 there 
is also place for the καθόλου as a usual or standard universal and that is the case when 
the καθόλου is referred to as “the one apart from the many, what is one and the same 
in all those things” (100 a 7–8), or as principle of art (τέχνη) and scientific knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) (100 a 8) . But I also tend to believe and admit that in the Physics I.1, there is 
also a stage of the described method where the standard universal occurs and this is when 
the analysis or the division of the concrete wholes takes place.
G. Bayer gives a plausible explanation of the distinction between the two kinds of 
καθόλου, when he says that “the familiar universal, which for the moment we can call 
the ′umbrella καθόλου′, is a single class umbrella with many particulars under it, e.g., 
′human′. The Physics I.1 καθόλου, … the ′composite καθόλου′, is a single composite with 
many attributes as parts, e.g., the cluster of attributes we pick out as ′Callias′”.42 But 
I question G.Bayer’s43 assertion concerning the relation between this special notion of 
καθόλου which occurs in the introduction to scientific investigation in the Physics I.1 and 
the more familiar universal which has the meaning of “one beside the many”. G. Bayer 
seems to identify the idea of “whole” with the idea of “one beside the many”, although 
he admits that both the “one” and the “many” are different in these two senses of the 
term “καθόλου”. I agree with him that we could describe the familiar universal as a single 
class umbrella with many particulars under it, and the Physics I.1 καθόλου as a single 
composite with many attributes as parts, but I argue that we ought to make the distinc-
tion between the “whole” and the “one beside the many”.
The Aristotelian “one beside the many” is the one and the same and common charac-
teristic or attribute which appears and exists in all these many things, being something 
other than they are, which means that it is different from them, because in this case 
the one is a concept or a notion while the many are bodies, but the one does not have 
a separate existence beside the many. The “whole” is also the one beside its many parts 
because it is something different from its many parts, but it does not exist in each of its 
parts, neither is something common in all of its parts and whereas it cannot exist without 
its parts it has a separate existence beside its parts. In addition, the parts of a whole can 
have the same composition or structure as the whole, which means that the parts might 
be composite as well.
41  See Bolton 1991: 6–9.
42  See Bayer 1997: 129.
43  See note 42.
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Because of this distinction between the idea of “whole” and the more familiar univer-
sal, which normally is construed as the “one beside the many”, Simplicius casts doubt 
upon the adequacy of the parallel Aristotle tries to draw between the whole and the 
composite on the one side, and the universal on the other side. According to Simplicius,44 
the example or the notion of “whole” and “composite” is appropriate to the subject of this 
first chapter of the Physics, but the notion of “universal” (καθόλου) does not fit well with 
the subject. What Simplicius says in justification of his criticism of the Aristotelian exam-
ples is that the universal does not consist of the particulars as elements of it, whereas the 
parts of the whole or the parts of the composite are its elements; besides, in the case of 
the composite, the composite is not attributed to each of its parts, whereas the universal 
(καθόλου) is attributed to the particulars.
Furthermore G. Bayer claims that “what seems to be the case in (the Posterior Analyt-
ics) II. 19 is that the first stage of coming to know is being described as καθόλου in both 
senses. Callias is the πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου in two senses: we see him as a compos-
ite καθόλου, a cluster of attributes including both essential human attributes as well as 
incidentals like ′bearded′, ′shod′, ′wearing a robe′, etc. But we also take this composite 
to be an umbrella καθόλου, in that we assume it to be typical, repeatable, ′universal′. 
Seeing Callias, one sees such a universal, ′human being′…With more experience of differ-
ent humans … we refine this confused πρῶτον… καθόλου, ′first item taken as universal′, 
shedding the incidentals until only essential attributes remain. This is the properly deter-
mined universal human, which was immanent in the first confused cluster of attributes 
we saw in Callias”.45 
I think that the last sentence of the above excerpt from G. Bayer’s article confirms that 
in fact the first stage of coming to know includes καθόλου in both senses, but not in the 
way G. Bayer suggests it. Especially, when we see Callias coming, we grasp him initially 
as a confused cluster of attributes, as an indiscriminate whole, but we do not also take 
this composite to be an umbrella καθόλου, because “human being” is at first only one 
attribute immanent in this confused cluster of attributes. The attribute “human being” 
is only a part of this confused whole we initially grasp. If we already have an idea of this 
καθόλου in our soul and we have defined it, we recognize it as καθόλου and we assume 
it to be typical, repeatable, immutable. However, we do not identify the confused whole 
with this καθόλου, which is only one attribute among the others-essential and incidental 
attributes. Nor do we grasp the confused whole as being the ordinary or familiar καθόλου, 
i.e., we do not see Callias coming just as human being and we do not identify the whole 
which represents Callias as being one specific καθόλου, even if this καθόλου, ′human 
being′, is the one which defines the substance of Callias. So, in my opinion G. Bayer is 
not quite right when he says, “Seeing Callias, one sees such a universal, ′human being′”. 
Seeing Callias coming one sees a cluster of attributes, one of which is ′human being′.
44  Simplicius in Phys.17.33–37.
45  Bayer 1997: 129–130.
41Aristotle’s Method of Understanding the First Principles of Natural Things in the Physics I.1
It is vital to pay attention to Philoponus’ explanation regarding the Physics I.1 
καθόλου, in order for us to conceive the way in which καθόλου is construed more as 
an indeterminate whole or an indeterminate individual rather than a usual or typical 
καθόλου: “… when we identify the one coming as animal, we do not identify it as a genus 
(for we know it is one thing), but as an indeterminate individual; and that is the partic-
ular… For the genus is not indiscriminate; whenever I say ‘animal’ I have defined the 
substance and whether it is said of thousands or of one, the substance of the animal will 
not be any the more or less known; but whenever I say ‘an animal’, since the meaning 
conveys not only the notion of animal but also of the existence of some differentia belong-
ing to it and separating it from the others, but does not yet add what the differentia is — 
for that belongs exclusively to the individual —  for this reason it is indiscriminate and 
inarticulate”.46 So, when we say that we identify something we perceive as indiscriminate 
or indeterminate [συγκεχυμένον], this means that we do not identify it as a genus or 
a species, because genus and species are not indiscriminate.
At this point, it is worthwhile to consider the explanation of Philoponus and Eustra-
tius regarding the passage of the Posterior Analytics II. 19, 100 a 15–b 5 in order to exam-
ine how this explanation can contribute to the clarification of the Physics I.1 καθόλου: 
Philoponus47 states that when someone sees Callias or Socrates perception grasps not 
only some incidental, but also some essential features, i.e. some common characteristics 
which are universal, e.g., that they are animals or that they are reasonable. From this first 
perception, of the universal, which is retained as a phantasm, there arises within the soul 
some first but uncertain knowledge of the universal. One comes to know the universal 
through the accumulation of similar sense data. Certain and secure knowledge of the 
universal arises out of many similar perceptions and of the retention of such perceptions 
as phantasms. As D. Modrak  points out: “because Callias is a member of all the classes 
involved, an exemplification of all the universals under consideration, the perception of 
Callias and the retained phantasma of Callias can serve as the basis for the apprehension 
of these universals”.48
But while these explanations shed light on the Aristotelian description of the articu-
lation of the universal in Posterior Analytics II. 19, I think that if we want to elucidate 
the way perception grasps the universal within the particular in the first chapter of the 
Physics, we have to pay attention to what Eustratius says about the relevant passage of the 
Posterior Analytics. Eustratius points out that when we see Socrates, perception, apart 
from Socrates, grasps also the man, without abstracting the universal from the partic-
ular, without abstracting the man from Socrates; our perception grasps the universal 
in a confused or jumbled way within the particular.49 Eustratius’ explanation offers us 
a hint at the difference between the universal considered as something general, in the 
46  Philoponus in Phys.13.1–12.
47  Philoponus in Analyt. Post. 437.21–31.
48  See Modrak 1987:169.
49  Eustratius in Analyt. Post. 266.10–16.
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sense of a class, and the universal considered as an indeterminate, undifferentiated and 
compounded whole. 
Eustratius’ explanation also reminds us of the way W. Wieland construes the καθόλου 
in the first chapter of the Physics. According to W. Wieland “Katholou here, of course, 
does not designate anything general in the sense of a class, but something general in the 
sense of indeterminate, something not yet differentiated into its factors… We may call this 
method of coming to know first principles an inductive method —  so long as we remain 
aware that induction does not have to signify merely the accumulation of particular facts 
and the consequent abstraction from them. Induction can start with a particular exam-
ple, from which it reads off a general characterization. After all, the distinction between 
general and particular is itself a product of reflection”50. 
In my opinion, it is reasonable to assert that perception of the καθόλου in the Phys-
ics I.1 has an affinity with this meaning of ἐπαγωγή (induction) which confines this 
cognitive procedure to an inductive insight into some universal point as a consequence 
of attending one particular case. Thus, from a single action of perception the cognitive 
subject could yield knowledge of the universal. G. Bayer correctly stresses that “it is by 
ἐπαγωγὴ from a single perception of a particular thing that we can surmise that this 
thing ′falls under a universal′”.51 He also points out that we cannot sustain the claim that 
perception alone is responsible for this initial grasp of the universal. In my view, it seems 
that the initial grasp of the universal is an exclusive task of perception. At least this is what 
we can infer from passage 100 a 16–b 1 of the Posterior Analytics II. 19 and 184 a 16-26 of 
the Physics I.152. But I agree with G. Bayer53 that perception is only the first step in the 
process that culminates in the possession of the universal.
This initial grasp of the universal by perception is not sufficient for the possession of 
the universal, and after all is not sufficient for acquiring knowledge of the principles of 
natural things. The universal in the first chapter of the Physics, considered as indiscrimi-
nate and undifferentiated whole grasped by perception, neither can serve as an explana-
tory cause nor can function as a principle of natural science, as H. Wagner54 correctly 
puts it, since it does not have a determinate articulated content. Natural philosopher or 
natural scientist has to analyze or divide this sense-perceptible whole into its constituents 
in order to yield knowledge of the principles of natural things.
50  See Wieland 1975: 131.
51  Bayer 1997: 123.
52  Pietsch (1992) points out that knowledge begins at the perception of the natural, composite thing, which 
is an individual, but he stresses the fact that what perception grasps is already a universal, since perception 
receives the immaterial forms, because one perceives “red”, and not this red; cf. De anima 424 a 17–19. Accord-
ing to Pietsch what is grasped by sense-perception is already a universal which should be described as an internal 
object of perception. He sets out the view that in Aristotle there is not absolutely unmediated knowledge of any 
extramental, i.e., natural, composite, thing. See Pietsch 1992: 64–65. In addition to what C. Pietsch argues, we 
have to keep our mind on the explanation of the ancient commentators, according to which perception grasps 
essential features of the particular, i.e., of the undifferentiated whole, and these features are universal. 
53  See note 51. 
54  See Wagner 1967: 395.
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4. The transition from μέθοδος to ὁδός: the task of scientific research and              
the real limitations of human knowledge
Thus, we have to make the necessary distinction between the καθόλου of the Posterior 
Analytics I.2, a principle of science, and the καθόλου of the Physics I.1, a starting point 
for the inquiry into the principles of natural things, which are also principles of natural 
science. The principles of science in the Posterior Analytics I.2 have only an epistemo-
logical content or value, whereas the principles of natural science in the Physics I.1 have 
also an ontological value since they are also principles of natural things. In the Posterior 
Analytics I.2, the discussion concerns science, or the knowledge of universals, but here in 
the Physics I.1, the καθόλου or universals are things more immediately cognizable to us 
by sense-perception, whereas the καθ’ ἕκαστα or particulars are the primary elements of 
natural things. This distinction between these two meanings of καθόλου is also reflected 
in the terminological difference which occurs in passage 184 a 10–23. Aristotle on the 
one hand employs the word μέθοδος (method) for scientific knowledge and scientific 
reasoning which is applied to various disciplines and is grounded on explanatory causes 
and principles and elements, and on the other hand employs the word ὁδός (route) to 
describe the procedure which a human intelligence follows in order to gain knowledge 
of the principles of natural things.55
G. E. L. Owen asserts that “there seems to be a sharp discrepancy between the meth-
ods of scientific reasoning recommended in the Analytics and those actually followed in 
the Physics… The discrepancy between the two works lies rather in the fact that, whereas 
the Analytics tries (though not without confusion and inconsistency) to distinguish the 
two processes of finding and then applying the principles, the Physics takes no pains to 
hold them apart”.56
I think that the Aristotelian distinction between μέθοδος (method) and ὁδός (route) 
in the first chapter of the Physics disproves Owens’ assertion. Aristotle seems to recognize 
that perceptual phenomena or perceptual appearances are the sources which provide the 
principles of natural things with their knowability and intelligibility. Given that the end 
or goal of natural science is what in each case appears authoritatively (κυρίως) in accord-
ance with perception, this accordance is the criterion by which we must ultimately test 
the adequacy of the principles of natural things in physics57 . 
   The transition from μέθοδος to ὁδὸς refl ects the distance between what is deter-
mined as the formal task of scientific research (the route from the causes and principles to 
55  See Horstschäfer 1998:17.
56  Owen 1986: 239. But Barnes finds no traces of these two different processes reported by G.E.L. Owen 
in the Analytics. Barnes suggests that “… the Posterior Analytics was never intended to provide the theoretical 
substructure for Aristotle’s scientific research… the theory of demonstrative science was never meant to guide 
or formalize scientific research: it is concerned exclusively with the teaching of facts already won; it does not 
describe how scientists do, or ought to, acquire knowledge: it offers a formal model of how teachers should 
present and impart knowledge”. See J. Barnes 1975: 77.
57  See De caelo III, 306a16–17. See Owen 1986: 243; Irwin 1988: 34.
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the things these causes and principles explain), and the real limitations of human knowl-
edge or the nature of human knowledge58. The words πέφυκε and ὁδός echo the devia-
tion of the naturally proper route to knowledge of the principles from the procedural 
methodology which is supposed to guide or formalize scientific research.
According to W. Wieland’s view “… Aristotle is not in the least concerned with the 
distinction between a subjective and an objective sphere, or between an order of being 
and an order of knowledge. He is concerned merely with different forms of knowledge 
(i.e., with ways in which a thing is known), not with an opposition between knowing and 
thing known, or with an ontological dualism…the path from what is better known to us 
to what is better known by nature, which Aristotle indicates is the path to knowledge, is 
emphatically not a path from not knowing to knowing, but a movement from one form 
of knowing to another”.59 W. Wieland correctly stresses that Aristotle’s method of natu-
ral science in the Physics I.1 is not concerned with an ontological dualism. Nevertheless, 
I think that each form of knowledge corresponds to a different ontological level, since 
what is better known to us is the particular (in this case the indeterminate composite 
particular, the compound), whereas what is better known by nature is the universal (in 
this case the principles of natural things).
5. The principles of natural things as principia realia
Normally, the universals in Aristotle do not have any ontological content, since they 
are mere conceptions and means of classification, but the principles of natural things 
are not only ratiοnes cognoscendi but also principia realia. As T. Irwin puts it “Aristotle 
also regards things ‒ non-linguistic, non-psychological, non-propositional entities ‒ as 
first principles… Actually existing things are first principles because they explain other 
things and our knowledge of the world requires us to know the explanatory relations in 
it… What is prior and better known by nature is both the propositional principle about, 
e.g., atoms, and the real principle mentioned in the proposition ‒ the atoms themselves. 
We grasp both sorts of principles at the same time and in the same way”.60
In fact, there is an interconnection between the ontological and the cognitive value 
of a principle. This interconnection is echoed through the concise definition which Aris-
totle formulates at the end of chapter Δ 1 of the Metaphysics: “it is therefore common to 
every origin to be the first point from which a thing is, or comes to be, or from which 
one gets acquainted with it” (1013 a 17–19)61. The method Aristotle suggests to the natural 
philosopher or the natural scientist in the opening chapter of his Physics is a philosophi-
cal method which proceeds to the active discovery of the principles of natural things 
58  Cf. Horstschäfer 1998:18–19.
59  See Wieland 1975: 129.
60  See Irwin 1988: 4.
61  Translation Kirwan 1993.
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by employing empirical inquiry62. Empirical inquiry, as Irwin puts it “begins from the 
particulars grasped in perception and proceeds to the universal grasped by reason”63. 
Since we begin with what is confused and look for a clear and thorough grasp of each 
perceptual form, the progress from what is confused to what is clear is the most promi-
nent feature of this procedure. 
6. The three stages of Aristotle’s method
This method of understanding the first principles is presented by Aristotle as the only 
ὁδός or as the naturally proper route one has to follow in order to find out the first prin-
ciples of natural things. Aristotle’s method includes or consists of three stages. Each of 
these stages represents a specific method but there is no need to talk about three different 
methods, because they are all included in one and single general method. We may call 
the first stage an inductive method or an inductive stage, so long as we remain aware that 
induction can start with a single perception, with a particular example, from which one 
can yield some essential features, some general or universal characteristics.64 
The second stage is διαίρεσις or ἀνάλυσις. Διαίρεσις as T. M. Horstschäfer65 correctly 
points out, is the method by which we can proceed from what is clearer and more know-
able to us to what is clear and more knowable by nature. Diairesis involves an analysis of 
compound indeterminate wholes in their parts or in their constituents which ultimately 
constitute the elements and principles of natural things. Therefore, διαίρεσις presup-
poses reason’s involvement, since “the distinction between general and particular is itself 
a product of reflection”.66 
The procedure of διαίρεσις involves an analysis of a whole to its parts. Aristotle illus-
trates this procedure well by means of the two examples that he refers to at the end of 
this first chapter of the Physics. A name signifies a certain whole in an indefinite way. 
On the other hand, the definition is a specification which signifies explicitly each of the 
essential properties that belong to the thing which bears this name and divides the thing 
as a whole into its proper essential and logical parts. Children at first call all men father 
and all women mother; later they distinguish each of them. According to Philoponus’ 
explanation this example  means  that    “children start off by having an indiscriminate 
knowledge of fathers and know them as human beings, not as fathers; hence they think 
all male human beings are fathers. But later when they can eventually attend to the prop-
erties of their father, then they get hold of an articulated knowledge of him and so distin-
62  Cf. Horstschäfer 1998:7.
63  See Irwin 1988: 43.
64  As Seidl (1995) puts it, sense-perceptible things already have at the level of sense-perception a non sense-
perceptible aspect, an aspect which is grasped by intellect. See Seidl 1995: 32.
65  Horstschäfer 1998: 20.
66  See Wieland 1975: 131.
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guish him from other human beings”.67 Philoponus explains that a child identifies every 
human being as father, because he does not have yet an idea of the καθόλου nor does he 
understand or possess the characteristics of the individual particular: “Even if the child 
identifies every human being as father, yet he does not have an idea of the universal, but 
of the particular, the indeterminate particular; he does not have the characteristics of the 
individual articulated, so that he applies to everyone those characteristics of the human 
being that he picked up at the start”.68 
Philoponus’ explanation explicitly shows that the reason why children call all men 
father and all women mother is not that they can recognize their father or mother, but 
they wrongly assign the name because they cannot link the name to the right person. 
The reason is not that children grasp the difference between their parents and the other 
people, but that they cannot express it at the level of language.69 The point seems to me 
rather that the child’s parents are parts of a collective universal,70 i.e., of a perceptible 
indiscriminate whole, and that the child is not yet in a position to recognize its own 
parents among the other persons.71 W.D. Ross is right when he points out that dividing 
the whole into its καθ’ἕκαστα means rather the analysis of a genus into its species, which 
is the business of logical division, not of definition. But definition, as Ross remarks, also 
analyzes a whole into its logical constituents, genus and differentia.72 It seems plausible 
to me that Aristotle would choose both of these procedures, the transition from name to 
definition on the one hand and logical division on the other, as illustrations of the second 
stage of the actual method of physics, that is of the analysis of the confused data of experi-
ence into their elements. 
The third stage of Aristotle’s method of natural science is induction in its usual mean-
ing, i.e., induction considered as an advance from particulars to universals. The natural 
scientist has to attend to many particular cases and discover which are the first principles 
of each particular under examination. The consequence of this scientific process is to 
acquire insight into some universal point, and in this case to acquire knowledge of the 
first principles of all natural things. It is worthwhile to mention Philoponus’ explanation73 
according to which when we have learned that one of the principles is matter, another 
form, another privation, we have moved on to something more articulated, but still inar-
ticulate and indiscriminate as regards the peculiar principles of each thing, since we have 
learned a theory that is general and indiscriminate. For instance, when we learn about 
67  Philoponus in Phys.11.19–23. 
68  Philoponus in Phys.12.29–13.1.
69  This is Horstschäfer’s interpretation (1998: 29–30). 
70  Wieland distinguishes between two meanings of katholou, regarding this example: the universal as a struc-
tural whole and the universal as a collective whole. Wieland believes that the example of children does not imme-
diately reflect the specific structure of the knowledge of principles, because it refers to the discrimination within 
a collective and not within a structural whole; see Wieland 19925 [1962]: 93.
71  Ross 1936: 457.
72  See note 71.
73  Philoponus in Phys.15, 26–16.1.
47Aristotle’s Method of Understanding the First Principles of Natural Things in the Physics I.1
matter, it is about matter that can be predicated of every sort of matter, it is about matter 
under its more general description.
7. Conclusion: Nature and the nature of human knowledge
So, neither knowledge of each natural thing nor knowledge of its first principles is unme-
diated, but each one becomes known through knowledge of the other as T. M. Horst-
schäfer74 correctly puts it. Regarding this cognitive process (which when it starts from 
the natural thing ends up in its first principles and when it starts from the first principles 
ends up in natural thing), Horstschäfer mentions the words of W. Kullmann75 who speaks 
of an ascending as well as a descending Dialectic. 
Furthermore, an interesting and at the same time thorny question emerges from this 
reflection: is there a similar Dialectic or a similar interaction or a similar interconnection 
between nature and the nature of human knowledge? We have noticed that the word 
πέφυκε in passage 184 a 16 refers to the nature of human knowledge. Can we say that the 
structure of the natural world to which we belong determines the structure and the form 
of our knowledge —  or at least the way in which we understand —  since we are parts of 
nature and at the same time observers of nature and cognitive subjects?
I think that the answer might be affirmative, if we consider that in the extramental 
world forms inhere in matter and the natural world consists of composite things, i.e., of 
bodies. Matter and form are not just parts, they are elements of the composite things, 
i.e., of natural things. Philoponus makes the distinction between an element and a part 
considered in its normal sense or a part properly said when he states, “Only in compos-
ite things are there elements, which is the same as to say only in natural things. For an 
element is that which is immanent in the thing and becomes a part of the composite, but 
not a part like the parts <of the body> in the normal sense, i.e. the uniform and organic 
parts: these have their own circumscribed location and activity, and each of them is allot-
ted a certain part of the composite; but the elements, by contrast, penetrate through and 
through each other and through the composite, so that there is not a jot of the composite 
that does not share in the elements”76. Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that any 
composite thing, i.e., natural thing, is a confused whole regarding every certain part or 
aspect of its structure. The natural thing, as a composite thing, is a confused whole not 
only in the sense that its elements in their entirety penetrate through and through the 
composite, but also in the sense that in every jot of it matter and form are mixed together, 
because they penetrate through and through each other. 
Aristotle’s method of inquiry into the principles of natural things in the Physics I.1 
seems to imply that since every natural thing is composite, i.e., has existence in reality 
74  Horstschäfer 1998: 16.
75  Kullmann 1975: 302.
76  Philoponus in Phys.7.25–32.
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and subsists as a composite, it can be initially grasped as a composite. The crucial point 
of Aristotle’s theory of method in the Physics I.1 is that perception, the only faculty of 
human being that can have access to the composite natural thing, naturally grasps it as 
an indiscriminate, inarticulate and confused whole.
Simplicius77 offers a reasonable explanation of this procedure in his commentary: 
composite things or compounds are more knowable to us than their constituents which 
are simple, because on the one hand we come to know composite things by perception, 
a faculty shared by all humans, and perceptual knowledge (knowledge derived from 
perception) is more accessible and familiar to us than any other form of knowledge, and, 
on the other hand, it is natural to reach knowledge of simple things, i.e., of principles, 
starting our inquiry with the composites. 
77  Simplicius in Phys.16.8–12.
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Aristotle’s Method of Understanding the First Principles of Natural 
Things in the Physics I.1
This paper presents Aristotle’s method of understanding the first prin-
ciples of natural things in the Physics I.1 and analyzes the three stages 
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of which this method consists. In the Physics I.1, Aristotle suggests that 
the natural proper route which one has to follow in order to find out the 
first principles of natural things is to proceed from what is clearer and 
more knowable to us to what is more knowable and clear by nature. In 
the Physics I.1, the terms καθόλου (universal) and καθ΄ ἕκαστα (particu-
lar) are not used in their usual meaning (e.g., the meaning which the 
same terms have in the Posterior Analytics I. 2). This paper examines 
the Physics I.1 in comparison with the Posterior Analytics II. 19 in order 
to elucidate the meaning of καθόλου in the first chapter of Aristotle’s 
Physics. Furthermore, it reaches the conclusion that the structure of 
the natural world to which we belong determines the structure and the 
form of our knowledge. On the one hand, natural things are composite 
and, on the other hand, perception is involved in the initial grasping of 
natural things as composites. Thus, since perceptual knowledge is more 
accessible to us than any other kind of knowledge it is natural to reach 
knowledge of simple things, i.e., of the principles, starting our inquiry 
with the composites.
Aristotle, method, natural things, principles, universal, particular, 
epagōgē, analysis
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